We consider eager-push epidemic dissemination in a complete graph. Time is divided into synchronous stages. In each stage, a source disseminates ν events. Each event is sent by the source, and forwarded by each node upon its first reception, to f nodes selected uniformly at random, where f is the fanout. We use Game Theory to study the range of f for which equilibria strategies exist, assuming that players are either rational or obedient to the protocol, and that they do not collude. We model interactions as an infinitely repeated game. We devise a monitoring mechanism that extends the repeated game with communication rounds used for exchanging monitoring information, and define strategies for this extended game. We assume the existence of a trusted mediator, that players are computationally bounded such that they cannot break the cryptographic primitives used in our mechanism, and that symmetric ciphering is cheap. Under these assumptions, we show that, if the size of the stream is sufficiently large and players attribute enough value to future utilities, then the defined strategies are Sequential Equilibria of the extended game for any value of f . Moreover, the utility provided to each player is arbitrarily close to that provided in the original game. This shows that we can persuade rational nodes to follow a dissemination protocol that uses any fanout, while arbitrarily minimising the relative overhead of monitoring.
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the impact of rational behaviour in epidemic dissemination protocols, executed over a complete graph [5] . An epidemic dissemination protocol operates as follows: a source splits a stream of bits into ν events, which are sent to a set of f nodes chosen uniformly at random, where f is known as the fanout; nodes repeat this procedure upon the first reception of each event. Protocols of this type are know to achieve a good tradeoff between high reliability of event delivery and communication overhead, and have been used in a variety of applications (e.g., video streaming [14, 13] ). In this context, rational behaviour may be characterised by the aim of maximising a utility. Rational nodes value the stream, but they prefer to send as few messages as possible, in order to spare bandwidth. Therefore, the utility can be defined as the difference between the benefits, which increase with the number of received events, and the communication costs for sending messages. This setting poses the problem that rational nodes always prefer not to forward any messages.
To address this issue, we explore the possibility of nodes interacting repeatedly in periodic executions of the dissemination protocol (e.g., weekly sporting events). This way, we can hold nodes accountable for their present behaviour in future interactions. Using Game Theory [16] , we study incentives to persuade rational nodes to follow the protocol assuming that nodes do not collude. We model interactions as an infinitely repeated game where future utilities are discounted to the present by some factor δ ∈ (0, 1), which determines the value given by players to future utilities 1 . This is adequate for modelling uncertainty about the number of interactions, given that players value present utilities over future ones [16] . Our aim is to study the range of the values of f used by dissemination protocols that correspond to equilibria strategies of the repeated game, i.e., where no player has any incentive to deviate from the protocol assuming that other players also do not deviate.
When players interact repeatedly, incentives may be based on direct or indirect reciprocity [17] . With direct reciprocity, each player i adapts his strategy towards every other player j in reaction to past actions of j directed towards i only. An example is the tit-for-tat strategy [3, 6] . Most epidemic dissemination systems that cope with rational behaviour also use direct reciprocity [14, 13, 11] . Unfortunately, strategies of this type are vulnerable to the redundancy of epidemic dissemination [18] . Namely, if a player i does not cooperate with j, then at best j may punish i. However, when redundancy is high, i has other neighbours from whom i receives events. Hence, the impact of such punishment is arbitrarily low, since i continues to receive events with sufficiently high probability. This makes direct reciprocity an ineffective type of incentives when f is large.
Indirect reciprocity circumvents the limitations of direct reciprocity by having nodes sharing information regarding private observations. This allows all the nodes to coordinate on effective punishments against any player i by not forwarding any event to i, decreasing his utility to 0. In Game Theoretical terms, we can punish each player by decreasing his utility to the minimax value. Under this possibility, we might apply a well known set of results called Folk Theorems, which state that we may devise equilibria strategies for infinitely repeated games that provide any feasible strictly positive utility to every player [15] , given that δ is sufficiently large. In particular, these results imply that we can cope with rational behaviour in dissemination while using any fanout. However, existing proofs of Folk Theorems assume that some underlying monitoring infra-structure provides information about the behaviour of each node, at no cost to the players [15] . Such assumption is unrealistic, since any implementation of a monitoring mechanism always incurs communication costs.
Goal : We show that we can cope with rational behaviour using any fanout and a monitoring mechanism that is not free of cost. For this purpose, we prove the existence of equilibria strategies for the game induced by the monitoring mechanism. We consider the notion of Sequential Equilibrium [12] , which is stronger than Nash Equilibrium (NE) since it excludes strategies that rely on non-credible threats. With monitoring, the notion of NE does not evaluate the optimality of a strategy when a player has observed a deviation and has to communicate this fact to other players. In line with the Folk Theorems, we also aim at providing any feasible and strictly positive utility to each player, which requires the minimisation of the communication overhead of monitoring relative to the original dissemination protocol. Existing works have faced the challenge of implementing a distributed monitoring mechanism [8] , and performed a game theoretical analysis of epidemic dissemination [18] . To the best of our knowledge, none has studied the range of f used by equilibria strategies of the repeated epidemic dissemination game.
Challenges: To fulfil our goal, we define a monitoring mechanism that extends the infinitely repeated epidemic dissemination game with additional communication rounds, and we propose a set of strategies for this game. In addition to disseminating a stream of events, nodes review the behaviour of every player and share this information, which is used to decide when to punish each player. When a punishment against a player i is in place, no node sends events to i, denying any benefit to i. This way, the threat of punishment out-weighs the gain from deviating from the specified strategy. The following main challenges are addressed:
Challenge 1: Strategic Monitoring. Players may deviate when sharing monitoring information. For instance, a punishment of any player i causes the overall reliability of dissemination to decrease. Hence, players are not willing to share information incriminating i.
Challenge 2: Mixed strategies. Nodes randomly select the neighbours to forward each event. The difficulty lies in preventing players from biasing this selection.
Challenge 3: Hidden Events. While observing the actions of i, player j does not observe the set of events received by i. Thus, the monitoring mechanism may raise false positives, causing players to be punished undeservedly.
Challenge 4: Overhead of monitoring. Nodes cannot share information regarding each disseminated event, otherwise the overhead of monitoring is not minimised. Though, monitoring only a subset of disseminated events introduces the problem of false negatives, where misbehaviour is undetected.
Summary of Contributions:
We devise a monitoring mechanism and a set of strategies that are Sequential Equilibria of the extended game for any fanout, provided that ν and δ are sufficiently large. These strategies also minimise the communication overhead of monitoring relative to the original dissemination protocol. It is important to notice that the overhead is minimised only relative to the total size of the stream. We use symmetric cryptography to cope with strategic monitoring. Assuming that symmetric ciphering costs are negligible and players are computationally bounded, this allows cheap punishments to be applied to players, while creating incentives for them to continue forwarding events. Our results offer an improvement over existing work towards the goal of designing a practical monitoring mechanism [8] , which does not consider strategic monitoring. We use a pseudo-random number to address the challenge raised by mixed strategies. We address the challenge of hidden events by relying on a trusted mediator to collect information about the events sent to and received from each node i. We minimise monitoring overhead by having nodes reporting in expectation on only a sub-linear number of events. The mediator coordinates the selection of these events to ensure that the probability of false negatives is sufficiently low, and that no false positives are raised.
Paper Organisation: The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our model. Section 3 contains the monitoring mechanism and strategies. In Section 4, we perform a Game Theoretical analysis of the strategies to prove the main result. Section 5 concludes the paper with a short discussion.
MODEL
We consider a synchronous message passing system with reliable and authenticated communication. The set of nodes is denoted by N , and n is its cardinality. We consider that N is common knowledge 2 . Players do not collude and have perfect recall. Time is divided into stages, which are further divided into τ synchronous rounds. In each stage t, the source disseminates a set E t of ν events, drawn from a much larger but finite set E. The process of generating E t must be sufficiently random, such that any player i can guess any e ∈ E t beforehand only with a sufficiently small probability. This is to justify the assumption that players prefer to receive these events than to try to guess them. Every event e ∈ E each node forwards e upon its first reception, also to a subset of f neighbours selected uniformly at random. This process ends until no node forwards e or until a maximum delay of ρ rounds to deliver e is reached, after which the event is said to expire. We assume that ρ does not increase with ν. A different event is introduced in each round by the source. We let τ ≥ ν + ρ to allow every event to be disseminated until it expires. We consider that the source is obedient to the protocol and may act as a trusted mediator. Using the language of [2, 20] , we say that the source is acquiescent. We treat every other player as rational, although our results still hold if other acquiescent players exist. In Section 5, we discuss how to distribute the role of the mediator. Players are assumed to be computationally bounded -they cannot break the cryptographic primitives used in our strategies, in the time required by a stage.
Interactions are modelled as an infinitely repeated epidemic dissemination game. An action of player i is a vector ai ∈ Ai specifying for each j ∈ N \ {i} a message ai(j) sent by i to j. Messages contains a finite number of tuples (id, e), where id ∈ {1 . . . ν} and e ∈ E. A history h ∈ H is a finite sequence of action profiles a ∈ A specifying all the messages sent after multiple rounds. Any player i cannot completely observe a history; instead, i only observes a corresponding private history hi ∈ Hi, specifying the messages sent and received by i in h. We say that histories hi and h are from stage t if the first round following these histories belongs to t. A strategy σi ∈ Σi specifies a probability distribution σi(.|hi) over the actions taken by i in the round immediately succeeding the observation of hi. A strategy profile σ ∈ Σ specifies the strategy followed by every player. Given any σ ∈ Σ, each player i forms a belief µ regarding the realised history h ∈ H after the observation of hi ∈ Hi, in the form of a probability µ σ (h|hi). µ is also common knowledge. If we fix some strategy profile σ that is suggested to be followed by any player, then in any realised history h ∈ H the behaviour of an acquiescent player i should always compatible with i having followed σ in h. Henceforth, whenever referring to a history h ∈ H and strategy profile σ ∈ Σ, we will implicitly consider that the behaviour of the source (and the mediator) in h is compatible with σ. Thus, we never analyse histories where acquiescent entities have deviated in the past, since this analysis is irrelevant to the proof of equilibrium. This fact is also captured by the defined belief system: for any hi ∈ Hi and h ∈ H, we have µ σ (h|hi) > 0 only if all acquiescent entities have followed σ in h. This implies that i never observes a deviation of some acquiescent entity in any hi.
Utility
The expected utility of the infinitely repeated game obtained by any player i depends on the following factors: i) the private history hi ∈ Hi observed by i, initially equal to ∅; ii) the strategy profile σ followed by every player; iii) the belief system µ; and iv) the realised utility ui of receiving events and sending messages during each stage following the observation of hi. The pair ( σ, µ) allows i to form an expectation of what occurred in the past, in terms of a probability distribution over the histories h ∈ H. Given any h, i can predict the future behaviour of any player j in any future stage t, given that j follows σj. More precisely, σ defines a probability distribution over the outcomes Z t ⊆ H of stage t, where each outcome z ∈ Z t is a history that matches the end of stage t. We denote by P σ (z|h) the probability of z being reached after h, given that players follow σ. The realised utility for stage t is a function ui(z) of the outcome z ∈ Z t reached in stage t. This function quantifies the average benefits of receiving events and the average costs of sending messages, per disseminated event. More precisely, we consider that every player receives a benefit β per received event e ∈ E t and incurs a cost α per bit sent in a message. ui(z) is given by the total benefits minus the total costs. We divide ui(z) by ν in order to normalise it to the average utility per disseminated event. We provide a formal definition of ui(z) in Section 3.4, after defining the monitoring mechanism.
With this in mind, the expected utility for stage t given the observation of hi, denoted by E σ,µ,t (ui|hi), is the weighted sum over every history h compatible with the observation of hi and outcomes of stage t following h:
Finally, for any i ∈ N and hi ∈ Hi from any stage t, E σ,µ (ui|hi) is the weighted infinite sum over every stage t ≥ t of the expected utility of t . We use a discount factor δ ∈ (0, 1) to discount future utilities to the present:
Notion of Equilibrium
We consider the notion of Sequential Equilibrium (SE) [12] . We say that a pair ( σ, µ) is a SE if it is Sequentially Rational and Consistent. ( σ, µ) is Sequentially Rational if σi maximises E σ,µ (ui|hi) for any hi ∈ Hi, conditional on the belief that other players follow σ after hi is observed. We do not include the formal definition of Consistency for brevity (c.f. [12] ). The above definition of Sequentially Rational pair ( σ, µ) is problematic, since it requires the analysis of all possible alternative strategies to that specified by σ. Fortunately, we can simplify this task by analysing only local deviations according to the One-deviation Property [9] . A local deviation for player i after private history hi ∈ Hi is an action that is not prescribed by σi with positive probability, while every player still follows σ after i observes hi, and i follows σi in every round following the deviation. Formally, let E σ,µ (ui|hi, ai) denote the expected utility of i when every player follows σ after hi is observed, except only that i follows ai immediately after observing hi.
Proposition 2.1. One-deviation [9] . The pair ( σ, µ) is Sequentially Rational iff for every i ∈ N , hi ∈ Hi, and ai, a i ∈ Ai such that σi( ai|hi) > 0, it holds:
Central Claim
In line with Folk Theorems [15] , we aim at defining equilibria strategies for any fanout f , while providing to each player any strictly positive expected utility of the dissemination game as the average utility of the repeated game. The average utility is computed as (1 − δ)E σ,µ (ui|∅), where ∅ is the initial empty history. When all players forward events using a fanout f , the expected utility for any stage is u(f ) = q(f )(β − γf ), where q(f ) is the probability of a given node receiving each event, β is the benefit per event, and γ is the cost for forwarding the event. Folk Theorems imply that, if β > γf and δ is sufficiently large, then an equilibrium strategy for the infinitely repeated game exists that yields u(f ) to every player as the average utility of the repeated game. In this work, we aim to prove a slightly weaker result. We can only ensure the existence of such strategy if ν is sufficiently large and β > cγf for some constant c > 0 that may be greater than 1 3 . Also, due to the overhead of monitoring, we can only provide to each player a utility arbitrarily close but never exactly equal toū(f ). Theorem 2.2 formalises the central claim.
Theorem 2.2. Fix any fanout f and constant > 0. There exist a monitoring mechanism, a strategy profile σ for the repeated epidemic dissemination game, and a belief system µ, and there exist constants c > 0,δ ∈ (0, 1), and ν ∈ N, such that, for every δ ∈ (δ, 1) and ν >ν, if β > cγf , then ( σ, µ) is a SE and, for every i ∈ N :
MONITORING MECHANISM
We extend the dissemination game by adding τ M monitoring rounds to each stage. For convenience, these rounds are added at the beginning of the stage. Therefore, a stage is now divided into τ = τ M + τ D rounds: the first τ M rounds are used for exchanging monitoring information; the last τ D rounds are used to disseminate events as in the dissemination game. Recall that ρ is the maximum delay to deliver any event. We still set τ D ≥ ν + ρ to allow every event to be disseminated until it expires. The trusted mediator is responsible for collecting monitoring information from each node. This consists in accusations and reports. An accusation flags a deviation of some player, whereas a report, which is relative to some id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, indicates for each pair of nodes (i, j) whether i sent to/received from j a tuple containing id. For each f > 0, we define a strategy profile σ f , and fix a belief µ f that is Consistent with σ f as defined in [12] . The main incentive for players to not deviate is based on indirect reciprocity. The mediator collects accusations and reports in stage t relative to the behaviour of each player i in stage t − 1, and gives a verdict on whether i should be punished during stage t. If i is punished, then i is still obliged to incur costs in stage t; if i deviates again, then his punishment is extended to stage t + 1. We address the main challenges as follows:
Strategic Monitoring: We enforce the following two properties. First, each player i is only allowed to send monitoring information relative to other nodes; information sent by i has no effect on the probability of i being punished. Second, regardless of the punishments being applied, the reliability of dissemination remains constant. We achieve this using commutative symmetric ciphering. For each node i, the mediator sends a key κi to every node j = i, used by j to cipher events sent to i. While being punished, i is unable to retrieve the disseminated events. However, i still forwards each ciphered event normally. Every node j = i receiving such event is aware that i is being punished and is capable of retrieving the original event, given his knowledge of κi.
Mixed Strategies: In dissemination rounds, every node i forwards each received event to a set S of f nodes. To prevent players from biasing the selection of S, S is specified 3 With appropriate optimisations, we can get c ≤ 3.
by a pseudo-random number generator (PRNG), seeded by a random number sdi, sent by the mediator to i only.
Hidden Events: For each pair of nodes (i, j) and id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, i reports to the mediator the round when i first received from/sent to j a tuple containing id. Given these reports, the mediator is able to determine whether i received id and forwarded it as expected. More precisely, the mediator verifies whether i forwarded id as specified by PRNG 
Monitoring Overhead : Nodes report only on a subset of events selected by the mediator in a non-deterministic fashion. The expected number of reported events is sub-linear on ν, such that the relative overhead of monitoring decreases as ν increases. More precisely, we split the identifier space {1 . . . ν} into n S sequences, each containing n E different identifiers. We define τ M = 2n S + 2. In the first monitoring round, nodes send accusations to the mediator. In each even round r < τ M , for each node i, the mediator decides whether to monitor the identifiers from the sequence corresponding to r, with independent probability p * . If so, then the mediator sends a notification to every node j = i, in which case j must report, in round r + 1, on the identifiers from the corresponding sequence. In the last round, the mediator sends the seeds, the keys, and the verdicts on each player. These parameters are specified in Section 4.3.
We now describe the main components of the monitoring mechanism in more detail.
Symmetric Cipher
Let K be the set of keys. For any key κ ∈ K, let (v)κ be the operation that returns datum v ciphered with κ. We will consider primitives for which the ciphering operation is the same as that of deciphering. Hence, it holds ((v)κ)κ = v. We need the following two properties to be fulfilled:
Integrity. For every κ ∈ K and e ∈ E, (e)κ ∈ E.
These properties hold when using any stream cipher, for which the ciphering operation consists in applying an xor between the datum and a stream of bits generated from the key. We need Integrity to ensure that players only send valid dissemination messages, regardless of the punishments. Commutativity is required for the scenarios when multiple punishments are applied simultaneously. More precisely, we need every player to be able to obtain disseminated events while not being punished. Moreover, we need every node to punish other nodes while being punished. This raises the following possibility. Consider nodes 1 to 4, and suppose that exactly both nodes 2 and 3 are being punished. Consider the following sequence of dissemination steps of event e: node 1 sends e 1 = (e)κ 2 to node 2; node 2 sends e 2 = (e 1 )κ 3 to node 3; and node 3 sends an event e to node 4. Since 4 is not being punished, we need to ensure that he is able to retrieve e from e . If 3 were to send ((e)κ 2 )κ 3 , then this would only be possible if 4 knew that the event followed the path 1, 2, 3. Instead, 3 sends e = (e 2 )κ 2 . By Commutativity, it holds e = (e)κ 3 . Since 4 knows κ3, he only needs to know that 3 is being punished in order to be able to retrieve e from e .
With this in mind, a node being punished may receive any event e ciphered with κi, and possibly ciphered with κj for some j = i. In order for punishments to be effective, i must not be able to retrieve e when it has no access to κi, and has not received e in plain, regardless of what dissemination messages i may have received in the past. For this purpose, we need to ensure that: 1) i never receives κi, which is true by construction of our strategy; and 2) κi = κj for every j ∈ N \ {i}, ensuring that ((e)κ i )κ j = e for any e ∈ E. In addition, we need the following property to hold.
Non-disclosure. For any event e ∈ E t disseminated in stage t with identifier id, player i ∈ N , and private history hi ∈ Hi from stage t, if for every tuple (id, e ) sent to i it holds that e = (e)κ i or e = ((e)κ i )κ j for any j ∈ N \ {i}, then i can only guess e with a probability arbitrarily close to p, where p is the probability of i guessing e given that the set of tuples sent to i is the same as in hi, excluding only the tuples with identifier id.
Intuitively, before receiving any tuple with identifier id, i can guess the corresponding event e ∈ E t with a small probability p. Non-disclosure ensures that i does not gain information that allows him to guess e with a probability significantly higher than p, provided that i only receives e ciphered with κi, and possibly with κj for some j ∈ N \ {i}. These properties can be fulfilled by using a block ciphering algorithm with the CTR mode of operation [4, 10] . A careful selection of keys is also required. To simplify, we have the mediator selecting a new unique key per node in each stage, generated uniformly at random.
Pseudo-Random Number Generator
We assume the existence of a function SG f i per node i, defined as follows. Given a seed sdi, this function returns a sequence of subsets, where SG f i (sdi, id) ⊆ N \ {i} is the of f nodes to whom i must forward the event with identifier id. We need SG f i to fulfil the following requirements. Assuming that sdi is chosen uniformly at random, the probability of SG f i (sdi, id) returning any subset S of f nodes is arbitrarily close to the probability p of i selecting S uniformly at random. Second, we need the stronger requirement of conditional independence. Namely, if we fix the subsets generated by SG f i for any identifier other than id, then the probability of SG f i (sdi, id) returning any subset S is still arbitrarily close to p. This is formalised by the following property. PRNG1. Fix any node i ∈ N , identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, and subsets S id ⊆ N \ {i} for each id ∈ {1 . . . ν} \ {id} such that |S id | = f . For any subset S id ⊆ N \ {i} with |S id | = f , the probability of SG f i (sdi, id) returning S id , conditional on sdi being selected uniformly at random and on SG f i (sdi, id ) returning S id for every id = id, is arbitrarily close to that where i selects S id uniformly at random. This property can be fulfilled by a PRNG function such as the one used in [1] . Additional details are included in [19] .
Strategy
It is useful to define σ f using a state machine representation [16] . Each history hi ∈ Hi is mapped into a private state of each player i. Transitions between states occur when players follow any action profile a ∈ A. Given any hi ∈ Hi, σ f i (.|hi) suggests a probability distribution over the set of actions available to i after the observation of hi. i may or may not follow this suggestion, such that a state may be reached where i knows he has deviated in the past. The only exception is acquiescent players, who never deviate.
We now specify the state, transition rules, and strategy for every i ∈ N , including the source.
State
Let rn ∈ {1 . . . τ } be the round number. Node i keeps for each node j a variable Θi(j) ∈ {Good , Bad }, where Θi(j) = Good iff i has observed only valid actions from j. In addition, i keeps a set Missi of sequences of identifiers that contain identifiers that were not forwarded appropriately according to SG f i . For each node j, i keeps two sets REi(j) and SEi(j) of tuples (id, r), representing events with identifier id received from and sent to j in round r, respectively. Finally, PEi contains tuples (id, e) with an identifier id and an event e to be forwarded. An important aspect is that this state is finite, implying that memory is bounded.
Transition Rules
Algorithm 1 contains the pseudo-code. Every node initialises Θi(j) = Good at the beginning of each stage and sets Θi(j) = Bad when j does not follow a valid action (Lines 12 and 17). Valid actions are enumerated as follows. In monitoring rounds, each message has a fixed size. In the first monitoring round, node i must send to the mediator for each j = i a message the size of an accusation against j. In any even monitoring round, for each node j = i such that the mediator requested the corresponding sequence of identifiers, i must send two tuples per identifier id from the requested sequence. If sufficient information is not available, then i must send padding. In a dissemination round, i is allowed to send any set of tuples (id, e), but only one tuple per identifier. Moreover, the identifier must not have expired and must have already been introduced. More precisely, define age(id, r) = r + 1 − (id + τ M ). Event with identifier id is introduced in round r such that age(id, r) = 1, i.e., r = τ M + id. A tuple containing id and sent in round r is valid iff age(id, r) ∈ {1 . . . ρ}. This restriction ensures that in any round every player has to forward at most ρ tuples to f nodes. To simplify, we assume that every node has sufficient bandwidth to send ρf tuples in a single round.
Node i registers in REi(j) and SEi(j) for each id ∈ {1 . . . ν} the round number when j first sent to and received from i a tuple containing id, in a valid dissemination message (Lines 19 and 23). When i receives id for the first time and id has not expired (age(id, rn) ≤ ρ), i selects a tuple (id, e) to be forwarded, sent by some node j chosen according to a deterministic rule such as the node with smallest identifier (Lines 25-30). If j is being punished, then i selects (id, (e)κ j ) forwards (Line 29). Let seq(id) denote the sequence to which identifier id belongs to. i adds seq(id) to Missi whenever i knows that, if the mediator requests reports relative to seq(id), then i will be punished (Line 21). This occurs exactly when the reports relative to id are inconsistent: i sends a tuple containing id to j / ∈ SG f i (sdi, id) (Line 33), i fails to send id to j ∈ SG f i (sdi, id) immediately after the first reception of id (Line 38), or i sends id prior to receiving it (Line 40). Notice that we update REi after updating Missi, such that identifiers first received in the present round do not count as being inconsistent.
Strategy Definition
The pseudo-code is included in Algorithm 2. Player i stops sending messages once Θi(i) = Bad , since a punishment in the next stage is inevitable. In the first monitoring round, 
3:
PEi, Missi ← ∅
4:
for all j ∈ N do
5:
REi(j), SEi(j) ← ∅
6:
Θi(j) ← Good
7:
Set Θi(i) = Bad if i sent invalid message 8: End 9: After any other monitoring round 10:
rn ← rn + 1
11:
12:
Update Θi(j)
13: End

14:
After dissemination round 15:
16:
17:
18:
for all valid id sent by i to j for the first time do
19:
Add (id, rn) to SEi(j)
20:
for all id ∈ {1 . . . ν}: inconsistent(id, SEi, REi) do
21:
Add seq(id) to Missi
22:
for all valid id sent by j to i for the first time do
23:
Add (id, rn) to REi(j)
24:
for all id ∈ {1 . . . ν} received for the first time do
25:
if age(id, rn) ≤ ρ then
26:
j ← node with smallest identifier to send id
27:
e ← event such that j sent (id, e)
28:
if i received accusation against j then
29:
e ← (e)κ j
30:
Add (id, e) to PEi
31: End
32: Predicate inconsistent(id, S, R)
33:
∃r (id, r) ∈ S(j) then
34:
return True
35:
else if ∃j,r (id, r) ∈ R(j) then
36:
r ← minimum round when i received id in R(j)
37:
if age(id, r) ∈ {1 . . . ρ − 1} then 38:
39:
40:
else if ∃j,r (id, r) ∈ S(j) then
41:
42:
else 43:
return False
44: EndPredicate
i sends an accusation against j = i iff Θi(j) = Bad at the end of the previous stage (Line 4). In an even monitoring round, the mediator notifies i for each node j = i whether i should report on the sequence S of identifiers corresponding to the current round, with probability p * (Line 9). When i receives this notification, i sends for each identifier id ∈ S any tuples (id, r) ∈ REi(j) and (id, r ) ∈ SEi(j) (Lines 12-16 ). In the last monitoring round, the mediator notifies every node l = j that j must be punished when some node k = j has sent an accusation against j, or he detects an inconsistency regarding some id ∈ {1 . . . ν}, according to the reports REj and SEj regarding events received and sent by j, respectively (Lines 19-27). The mediator also sends sdi to i and κi to every j = i. In a dissemination round, i sends any tuple (id, e) ∈ PEi to every j ∈ SG f i (sdi, id), ciphering e with κj if j is being punished (Lines 30-34) . Notice that i only sends a tuple (id, e) if seq(id) / ∈ Missi. This is because once i fails to send some identifier from sequence seq(id), sending id as specified by SG f i does not affect the probability of being 
8:
9:
With probability p * , send (j, Monitor) to every l = j
10: End
11:
Upon odd monitoring round | 1 < rn < τ M and Θi(i) = Good
12:
for all j ∈ N \ {i}: mediator sent (j, Monitor) do
13:
Sj ← current sequence of identifiers
14:
Send all tuples (id, r) ∈ REi(j) with id ∈ Sj
15:
Send all tuples (id, r) ∈ SEi(j) with id ∈ Sj
16:
Send padding
17:
End 18: Upon last monitoring round τ M | i is mediator
19:
20:
if ∃ l =j l sent accusation against j then
21:
Send accusation against j to every o ∈ N 22:
23:
Send accusation against j to every l ∈ N
24:
sdj ← random value
25:
Send sdj to j
26:
κj ← unique random key
27:
Send κj to every l = j
28:
End
for all (id, e) ∈ PEi : seq(id) / ∈ Missi do 31:
32:
if i has accusation against j then
33:
34:
Send (id, e) to j
35: End
36:
Upon dissemination of event e ∈ E t | i is the source 37:
38:
Add (id, e) to PEi 39: End punished in the next stage. Thus, it is optimal to drop every tuple with an identifier from that sequence. Later, we specify how to define p * such that for every identifier id with seq(id) / ∈ Missi it is still optimal for i to forward id.
Realised Utility
We now define ui(z) for every outcome z ∈ Z t of any stage t. We consider that every player i incurs a fixed cost α per bit sent in any message. In addition, i obtains a benefit β per event e ∈ E t received by i during stage t. We denote the set of received tuples by reci(z), where for every (id, e) ∈ reci(z) we have e ∈ E t . Two issues arise when trying to define reci(z): 1) the exact definition of i receiving (id, e) and 2) the reception of ciphered events.
Regarding the first issue, since we are considering reliable communication channels, i receives (id, e) iff some node j = i sends (id, e) to i. Thus, we may consider that i obtains a benefit β in this case. However, given our definition of strategies, it is possible that i sends (id, e) to some node before receiving it in the first place, and then this tuple loops back to i. Such behaviour increases the expected utility of i. Since i is unlikely to guess e beforehand, we consider that i values e iff i knows that it could not have been introduced by i. More precisely, i receives a benefit β per disseminated tuple (id, e) with e ∈ E t iff some j = i sends (id, e) to i in round r of stage t, and i has not sent (id, e) to any node in any round r < r.
Regarding the second issue, it is possible that i never receives some e ∈ E t in plain, but instead ciphered with the key κj of some node j = i. We define the strategy in a way that, if e = (e)κ j and i receives e , then it is because j is being punished, j has sent e to i, and i knows that j is being punished. Hence, i is able to compute (e )κ j and retrieve e. In addition, it may be possible that a history is reached where i receives e ciphered with multiple different keys and i is still able to retrieve e. To generalise this intuition, we say that i is able to retrieve e from e whenever i can perform some computation over e that returns e, given the history of interactions with other nodes. i can retrieve e from e when e = e . Also, if i can retrieve e from e , i receives e = (e )κ j from j, and i knows that j is being punished with key κj, then i can retrieve e from e . By Non-disclosure, if some j sends (id, e ) to i and e = (e)κ i or e = ((e)κ i )κ j , then i cannot retrieve e from e . We do not make any further assumptions regarding when i can retrieve e from e .
With this in mind, we consider that, for any e ∈ E t disseminated by the source with identifier id, we have (id, e) ∈ reci(z) iff there exists a round r from stage t and node j ∈ N \ {i} such that j sends (id, e ) to i in round r, i can retrieve e from e , and i has not sent (id, e ) in any round r < r from stage t such that i can retrieve e from e . This leads to the following definition of realised utility. Recall that we normalise the total benefits and costs to the average per disseminated event, by dividing it by ν. Let |z 
ANALYSIS
The analysis is divided into three parts. First, we prove correctness properties of σ f for any f > 0. Then, we use these properties to compare the utility of following σ f with that of deviating. We conclude with the proof of the main result. We use the notation v h and v h i to denote the value of state variable v after any histories h and hi are realised, respectively. In this context, we say that a history h succeeds h if P σ f (h |h) > 0; h immediately succeeds h if h is reached one round after h. Similarly, h precedes h if h is a starting subsequence of h, and immediately precedes h if h = (h , a) for some a ∈ A.
Correctness
We show two sets of properties regarding monitoring and dissemination. Monitoring properties characterise the probability of any node i ∈ N being punished in the present or future stages as a function of the current state. Dissemination properties quantify the probability of any node i receiving events, already disseminated or disseminated only in the future, as a function of the current state. This allows us to compute the expected utility for each possible local deviation by i, and prove that every ( σ f , µ f ) is a SE by applying the One-deviation Property. The proofs are in [19] . Lemma 4.1 enumerates monitoring Properties M1-M4 valid for any player i and history h, assuming that every player follows σ f after h. M1-M3 state that the probability of i being punished in the next stage is a function of Θ h i (i) and Miss h i , while i is never punished in future stages other than the next. In addition, Property M4 shows that i cannot influence the punishments being applied to him in the present.
Lemma 4.1. For any history h ∈ H from stage t ∈ N and player i ∈ N , the following properties hold: M1. If Θ h i (i) = Good, then the mediator accuses i in stage t + 1 with probability P (|Miss
i (i) = Bad, then the mediator accuses i in stage t + 1 with probability 1.
M3. The mediator never accuses i in any stage t > t + 1.
M4. For any two actions ai, a i ∈ Ai and round r > rn h from stage t, i is punished in round r either by every node or by no node, the probability of i being punished is the same after a * i and a i , and every node j ∈ N \ {i} gets the same key κi.
Lemma 4.2 enumerates dissemination properties D1-D5.
Given any history h from stage t, event e, and node i, let g h (e, i) = (e)κ i if the mediator triggers a punishment of i in stage t, or g h (e, i) = e otherwise. For any history h and two actions a * i and a i , we use the notation v * i (i) and v i (i) to represent the value of any state variable vi resulting from i following a * i and a i after h, respectively. For some j and message ai(j), we consider that id ∈ ai(j) for some j if there exists a tuple (id, e) ∈ ai(j). Properties D1-D3 refer to events introduced only in the future. Namely, Property D1 states that, regardless of the punishments being applied, if the source disseminates a tuple (id, e), then every node i either receives id and computes g h (e, i), or does not receive id. This shows that if a player i is being punished and he receives a tuple containing id, then he is only capable of computing (e)κ i , and is unable to retrieve e by Non-disclosure. D2 and D3 indicate that i cannot influence the probability of receiving any event not yet introduced. Properties D4-D5 refer to events being disseminated. More precisely, D4 states that if i follows two alternative actions in which i sends the exact same identifiers to each node, then i receives a tuple containing an identifier already disseminated after both actions with the same probability. D5 states that if the source previously disseminated a tuple (id, e) and i follows two actions a * i and a i where i does not send more tuples containing id in a * i than in a i to any node, then the probability of i retrieving e after following a * i is at least as high as after following a i . Lemma 4.2. Fix any history h ∈ H from stage t ∈ N, player i ∈ N , and identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}:
D1. If the source introduces (id, e) after the realisation of h, then for all history h * ∈ H from stage t succeeding h, player j ∈ N , and (id, e ) ∈ PE h * j , it holds e = g h (e, j).
D2. For every t > t and any two actions a * i , a i ∈ Ai, the probability of i receiving some tuple containing identifier id in stage t after i follows a * i is the same as after a i . D3. If id is introduced in stage t after h is realised, then for any two actions a * i , a i ∈ Ai, the probability of i receiving some tuple containing identifier id in stage t after i follows a * i is the same as after i follows a i .
D4. Fix any two actions a
and ii) for any j ∈ N , id ∈ a * i (j) iff id ∈ a i (j). If id is disseminated in stage t before h is realised, then i receives some tuple containing id after following a * i iff the same holds after following a i .
D5. Let e ∈ E
t be the event disseminated with identifier id. Fix any two actions a * i , a i ∈ A h i that fulfil: i) Θ * i (i) = Θ i (i) and Miss * i = Miss i ; and ii) for each j ∈ N , id ∈ a * i (j) only if id ∈ a i (j). For every outcomes z * , z ∈ Z t succeeding a * i and a i , respectively, if id is introduced in stage t prior to h being realised and (id, e) ∈ reci(z ), then (id, e) ∈ reci(z * ).
Lemma 4.3 enumerates dissemination Properties D6 and D7, which quantify the probability of node i receiving each disseminated event. D6 states that this probability is arbitrarily close to q(f ) for events disseminated in future stages, which is true by PRNG1. D7 states that for any event with identifier id introduced in future rounds of the present stage this probability is at most q(f ) + ξ for an arbitrarily small ξ. This follows from the fact that i learns for each player j = i at most the value SG f j (sdj, id ) for every id previously introduced, but i does not learn these values for id. Hence, any seed yielding any subset SG f j (sdj, id) is possible and equally likely to have been chosen by the mediator, independently of the subsets generated for other events. By Consistency of ( σ f , µ f ), i believes this to be true. By PRNG1, it follows that the probability of any node receiving id is at most arbitrarily close to q(f ), although it may be lower due to the existence of players that drop id. Lemma 4.3. Fix any player i ∈ N , private history hi ∈ Hi from stage t ∈ N, and identifier id ∈ {1 . . . ν}:
D6. For every constant ξ > 0 and stage t > t, there exists a function SG f i such that i receives some tuple containing identifier id in stage t with probability q fulfilling |q − q(f )| < ξ.
D7.
If id is introduced in stage t after hi is observed, then for every constant ξ > 0 there exists a function SG f i such that i believes that will receive some tuple containing identifier id in stage t with probability at most q(f ) + ξ.
Utility Analysis
In line with the One-deviation property, the goal of this section is to compute the difference between the expected utilities E σ f ,µ (ui|hi, ai) − E σ f ,µ (ui|hi, a i ) of player i following two alternative actions ai and a i after any private history hi. We divide the difference between expected utilities calculated from stage t into three parts: long-term utilities, referring to any stage t > t + 1; medium-term utilities relative to stage t + 1; and short-term utilities relative to stage t. We will denote by γ the cost of sending a tuple.
Long-term
Lemma 4.4 shows that the expected utility of any stage t > t + 1 is fixed, regardless of the present action in stage t. The reason for this is that by our definition of strategy, regardless of what player i does in stage t, he sends every requested message in stage t . Also, since he does not deviate in any future stage, he is never punished in stage t , receiving all events with a fixed probability.
Lemma 4.4. Fix any player i ∈ N , private history hi ∈ Hi from stage t ∈ N, and any two actions a * i , a i ∈ Ai. For every t > t + 1, we have: E σ f ,µ,t (ui|hi, a * i ) = E σ f ,µ,t (ui|hi, a i ).
Medium-term
In this case, the difference between expected utilities is fully determined by whether i is punished in stage t + 1, as shown in Lemma 4.5. More precisely, as with long-term utilities, any player i forwards a fixed expected number of messages during stage t + 1. However, now the benefits are either 0 if i is punished, or fixed. The probability of i being punished is determined by the behaviour of i during stage t.
Lemma 4.5. Fix any player i ∈ N , private history hi ∈ H from stage t ∈ N, and any two actions a
